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APPLICATION OF THE UNIT RULE TO THE VALUATION OF
COAL RESERVES IN CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS
IN KENTUCKY AND WEST VIRGINIA
ANDREW S. ZETULE*
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and the
corresponding provisions of state constitutions, which mandate the
payment of just compensation upon the sovereign's exercise of the
power of eminent domain, have given rise to well-settled definitions of
"fair market value" and other terms of appraisal which have been
generally accepted by the various federal and state courts.' When such
concepts, however, are applied to the appraisal of property containing
marketable coal reserves, the uniformity of appraisal methods shatters,
and coal-producing states (such as Kentucky and West Virginia) have
drastically different approaches to the application of the so-called "unit
rule." Further distinctions are triggered in federal eminent domain
proceedings involving the taking of coal properties in either state.
The judicial constraints upon the verbal framework within
which appraisers must express opinions regarding the value of minerals
have their origin in the unit rule which prohibits evidence of the
separate value of improvements, timber, minerals or other
characteristics of the property. The unit rule addresses the concern that
separate valuation of components of property could allow property to
be valued for its adaptability to inconsistent uses and could result in
inflated values where the sum of the parts exceeds the whole. The
statement of this rule, as adopted by Kentucky, is that, "where land
containing minerals is condemned, the quantity and quality of the
minerals may be properly considered as affecting the market value of
the landbut they cannot be valuedseparately.2 The application of the
unit rule to the valuation of properties with mineral reserves prevents
the appraiser from stating a per-ton value of the minerals in place, thus

'Partner, Huddleston, Bolen, Beatty, Porter & Copen, Huntington, West Virginia; B.S.
1970, M.S. 1974, Ph.D. 1980, The Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1977, Vanderbilt
University School of Law.
'See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
'Gulf Interstate Gas Co. v. Garvin, 368 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Ky. 1963). See also Gulf
Interstate Gas Co. v. Garvin, 303 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1957).
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limiting the explanation of the rationale which forms the basis of the
appraiser's valuation.3
1. APPLICATION OF THE UNIT RULE

A. Kentucky's Unit Rule
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Gulf Interstate Gas Co. v.
Garvin4 stated as a rationale for the application of the unit rule, a
concern that the condemnor would be required to pay compensation for
separate interests in land which exceed the market value of the whole
property. Since this concern could have been addressed by an
appropriate jury instruction, the principal basis for the adoption of the
unit rule appears to have been an evidentiary determination that, "it is
practically impossible to obtain credible evidence of the reasonable
market value of fire clay in place because it is not bought and sold as
such and has no market value as such." 5
In Kentucky DepartmentoffHighways v. CardinalHillNursery,
Inc.,6 the Kentucky Court of Appeals applied the unit rule and reversed
the lower court's decision because the landowner's appraisal witnesses
testified to the value per acre of limestone in place. The Court stated,
without exception or qualification, that "minerals cannot be valued
separately."7 A dissent, however, by Justices Palmore and Milliken
sought to restrict this holding by pointing out that coal rights are
commonly bought and sold separately in large areas of Kentucky! The
dissenting justices concluded that, "[n]o man about to buy a tract of
land in such an area could sensibly evaluate it independent of the
prevailing market value of the coal rights." 9 Justices Palmore and
Milliken thus pointed out that the underlying evidentiary basis for
adopting the unit rule does not apply to coal reserves.'0

3

A separate valuation of minerals may be presented where the surface and mineral
estates have been severed and are not coextensive. Kentucky Dep't of Highways v. Chapman, 391
S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1965); Kentucky Dep't of Highways v. Southard, 438 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1969).
4Garvn, 368 S.W.2d at 309.
Id.at 311.
'Kentucky Dep't of Highways v. Cardinal Hill Nursery, Inc., 380 S.W.2d 249 (Ky.
1964).
,Id.
at 254.
'Id. at 255.
1d.at 255. Justices Palmore and Milliken cautioned that the witness should not be
permitted to give the separate value of the coal rights without first estimating the value of the
whole property.
'ld.
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In Kentucky Department ofHighways v. Davis," however, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that the failure to strike opinion
testimony regarding the separate value of coal reserves was reversible
error and cited CardinalHill Nursery as controlling precedent without
discussing the Palmore and Milliken dissent. 2 Without critical
analysis, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has continued to reiterate the
platitude that, "[n]either the minerals or timber should be valued
separately."' 3
B. West Virginia's Unit Rule
Like Kentucky, West Virginia initially adopted the "unit
rule."' 4 In West Virginia Department of Highways v. Berwind Land
Co., " however, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals departed
from the unit rule because the courts found it difficult, if not
impossible, under the unit rule to "devise a method of valuation which
would lead to a precise dollar figure to be attached to separate elements
of value which could be relied upon by the jury in fixing the amount of
just compensation."' 6 The court noted that the "fixed price per unit
method" of valuation had been initially rejected as being predicated on
speculation and conjecture, but that methods of measuring the quantity
and quality of minerals in place have since been greatly refined. 7 The
court concluded that the ability to provide thejury with a more accurate
method of calculating the fair market value of mineral-bearing
properties warranted a modification of the unit rule and held that "if the
existence and quantity of minerals or other elements of value in a fee

"Kentucky Dep't of Highways v. Davis, 400 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. 1966).

"Id. The court noted that it was doubtful whether there had been sufficient evidence
to establish a marketable coal reserve; and it is thus difficult to determine to what extent the
questionable nature of the coal reserve affected the court's analysis. See also Kentucky Dep't of
Highways v. Gearhart, 383 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1964); West Kentucky Coal Company v. Kentucky
Dep't of Highways, 368 S.W.2d 738 (Ky. 1963).
"Kentucky Dep'tof Highways v. Gardner, 388 S.W.2d 360,362 (Ky. 1965); Witbeck
v. Big Rivers Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 412 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Ky. 1967), overruled on other
groundsby Kentucky Dep't of Highways v. Stephens Estate, 502 S.W.2d 71 (Ky. 1973); accord
Kentucky Dep't
of Highways v. Rice, 411 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1966).
'4Strouds Creek & M. R. Co. v. Herold, 45 S.E.2d 513, 516 (W.Va. 1947). In a
condemnation proceeding to take land which contains coal as to which there has been no severance
of title, evidence offered by the land owner of a separate value of the land apart from the coal and
of a separate value of the coal is inadmissible for the purpose of establishing the market value of
the land, id

"5West Virginia Dep't of Highways v. Berwind Land Co., 280 S.E.2d 609 (W.Va.

1981).
'1d. at 614-15.
"Id. at 615-16.
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estate can be accurately determined, an expert witness may testify to his
opinion of the value in place of one unit of that element and multiply it
by the quantity of that resource present in or on the land to determine
the value of the element in place."18
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals modified the unit
rule to permit the introduction of evidence of the separate values of the
elements present in or on the land if: (1) the existence and quantity of
the element of value can be accurately determined; (2) other factors,
such as the expense of production and marketing, were taken into
consideration in arriving at the value sought to be introduced; (3) the
element is clearly significant in value; and (4) the use of the property
for purposes of exploiting that element of value is not inconsistent or
incompatible with the highest and best use to which the property may
be put, or that the value of the secondary use is reduced to the degree
it interferes with the highest and best use of the property taken.19 The
court further directed that the jury should be instructed that "evidence
of separate values is only a factor to be considered in determining the
total market value of the land; to the extent such separate values are
inconsistent with the highest and best use of the land they should be
disregarded in arriving at the figure ofjust compensation." 20
In Equitable Gas Co. v. Kincaid,2 the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals approved the "coal royalty method of valuation" and
noted that such method of valuation appeared to be more accurate than
the opinion testimony regarding the market for coal in place which had
been approved in the Berwind Land Co. decision.22
C. The Sixth Circuit Examines the Unit Rule
The method of determining just compensation in federal
condemnations is governed by federal case law.23 The application of

"ld. at 619.
621.

"id.
at
20
ld.
2

'Equitable Gas Co. v. Kincaid, 285 S.E.2d 421 (W.Va. 1981).
11d. The coal royal method of valuation had been previously rejected in Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. Davis, 52 S.E. 724 (W.Va. 1906).
21United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 379-80 (1943); United States v. 93.970 Acres
of Land, 360 U.S. 328,332-333, (1959);United States v. 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396, 1400
(9th Cir. 1986). Where a private party, however, is exercising the power of eminent domain
pursuant to a federal statute, the courts may adopt state law as the federal standard and thus
determine just compensation in accordance with the substantive law of the state in which the
property being taken is located, Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural Gas
Storage Easement 962 F.2d I192 (6th Cir. 1992); Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Tabor,
2
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the unit rule, however, by United States Courts of Appeal for the Fourth
and Sixth Circuits has differed in important respects.
24
the Sixth Circuit concluded
In Devou v. City of Cincinnati,
that the value of buildings could not be ascertained irrespective of the
land." The court noted, however, that there may be cases where it
would be proper to permit testimony regarding improvements separate
from the land, and thus departed from the unit rule. Nevertheless, the
court ruled that since there was adequate testimony regarding the
market value of the property as a whole, evidence regarding the
separate improvements would not be allowed.26 The Sixth Circuit, thus,
suggested that departure from the unit rule may depend upon the
availability of comparable sales.
Although only a district court opinion, United States ex rel.
2
Tenn. Valley Authority v. Indian Creek Marble Co." provided early
precedent for the application of the unit rule to minerals. The district
court noted that, "[flixing just compensation for land taken by
multiplying the number of cubic feet or yards or tons by a given price
2
per unit has met with almost uniform disapproval of the courts." The
court stated that unit valuation "assumes not only the existence, but the
continued existence of a stable demand at a stable price," and assumes
a stable production cost. 9 The court concluded that the rejection of
such a valuation was required because it ignores all of the unknown and
uncertain elements which are inherent in the business of producing and
marketing minerals.3"
In United States v. 2,847.58 Acres of Land,3' the condemnor
relied upon Indian Creek Marble and argued that the units-times-price
32
method of valuation was too speculative to permit its introduction.
The Sixth Circuit, however, noted that there had been no testimony in

757 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1985); Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980); or,
depending upon the statute, federal common law may be applied, National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. Two Parcels of Land, 822 F.2d 1261, 1266-67 (2nd Cir. 1987).
2
"Devou v. City of Cincinnati, 162 F. 633 (6th Cir. 1908).
'Id. See also Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 884, 888 (6th Cir.
1937), where the Sixth Circuit rejected separate evidence of the value of timber on the property
being taken because the stumpage value of the timber was "necessarily" affected by the location,
surroundings, and value of the land for other than timber-production.
2
'Devou, 162 F. at 636.
"United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811
(E.D. Tenn. 1941).
Bd at 822.
29

1d.

'Id.
"United States v. 2,847.58 Acres of Land, 529 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1976).
3d.
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Indian Creek Marble that an established market existed for marble.33
The court also stated that it did not interpret the Indian Creek Marble
case to "establish a rule that unit-times-price valuations are never to be
received as evidence."34 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit distinguished
several cases from other circuits which had rejected a units-times-price
approach to valuation because there had been insufficient evidence of
an established market for the minerals, while in the subject case, the
court noted that there was evidence that an active market for
unrecovered oil existed." Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's admission of expert testimony that a willing buyer would
pay a willing seller about a dollar per barrel for the oil in place.36 In
justifying the admission of such testimony, the Sixth Circuit noted that
the government witnesses testified that they knew of no comparable
sales to use as a basis to establish the fair market value of the oil and
gas interests being taken.37 In citing Olsen v. United States,3" the Sixth
Circuit put forth the proposition that where comparisons are
unavailable, the fair market value must be "estimated". 9 The Sixth
Circuit also cited Welch v. Tennessee Valley Authority40 for the
proposition that evidentiary restraints must be loosened when
comparable sales are unavailable.4
Similarly, in the absence of probative comparable sales, the
Sixth Circuit, in United States v. 103.38 Acres of Land,42 allowed
testimony as to the value of coal in place. This value was determined
by multiplying the recoverable tonnage by a given royalty per ton. This

"Id. The Sixth Circuit also purported to distinguish Indian Creek Marble because it
was a partial taking. The Sixth Circuit stated that a unit-times-price valuation was improper
because the interference with mining would be taken into consideration in determining an "after"
value. However, logic suggests that whether the value of the mineral is lost by a total taking or by
the loss of the ability to recover the mineral because of partial taking should have no effect upon
the method of valuation employed to measure the loss of value.
11d.at 686.
"Id.at 687.
ld.at 685. Despite such language, the Sixth Circuit noted with apparent approval that
the trial court had advised the jury that it could not compute value merely by using a unit-timesprice formula.
7
1d. at 686.
"Olson v. United States, 292 United States 246, (1934).
"2,847.58 Acres of Land, 529 F.2d at 686.
"Welch v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 108 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1939). "Sales at arms [sic)
length of similar property are the best evidence ofmarket value. However, in the absence of such
sales, there is no single measure of value which may be applied rigidly and uniformly in the
determination of the market value of lands, and each case must be considered in the light of its
own facts." Id.
at 101.
"2,847.58 Acres of Land, 529 F.2d at 686.
2
United States v. 103.38 Acres of Land, 660 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1981).
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product was then discounted to its present value." The Sixth Circuit
stated that the party offering valuation evidence based on royalty
capitalization must establish: 1) that an active market exists for the
mineral in place; 2) that transactions between willing buyers and
willing sellers in that market commonly take the form of royalty
payments; and 3) that the figures on which an award might be based
represent the conclusions of an industry expert." The court further
noted that the trier of fact must be made aware, presumably by
appropriate instruction, that "the value of the mineral deposit itself may
or may not be substantially equivalent to the value of the mineralbearing property as a whole."4" The court further suggested that insight
into the case-by-case application of the unit rule could be found in
UnitedStates v. 91.90 Acres of Land."'
The Sixth Circuit's reference to UnitedStates v. 91.90 Acres of
Land is enigmatic because the case involved a classic application of the
unit rule. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held it to be error for the landowner's experts to add together separate
values of the surface and minerals and to make estimates of the mineral
in the ground, and multiply that tonnage by a fixed unit price.47 The
court, however, specifically concluded that UnitedStates v. Sowards,4"
and Mills v. United States" do not stand for the proposition that the
unit-times-price formula is never competent evidence in federal
condemnation actions. Rather, that method of valuation is forbidden
only if: (1) no market for the mineral in place is established; or (2) the
valuation witness lacks the requisite industry expertise."
Although it allowed the coal to be directly valued in United
States v. 103.38 Acres of Land, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that
comparable sales analysis is the "preferred method" of establishing a
property's fair market value 5 and stated that, "If either party had
submitted probative evidence of truly 'comparable sales,' it might have

"3The Sixth Circuit rejected the "hypothetical cash flow" analysis offered by the
landowncer's expert because it was not "demonstrably related to the actual market in mineral
royalties." Id. at 214-15.
441d

at 212-13.

451d at 212.
46United
States v. 91.90 Acres of Land, 586 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1978).
47
1d. at 212.

4'United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1966).
4Mills v. United States, 363 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1966).
-'103.38Acres ofLand, 660 F.2d at 213.
"Id.at 211.
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been unnecessary to appraise the mineral deposit as an entity separate
from the tract as a whole. 5 2
The Sixth Circuit thus appears to have established an
exclusionary rule where valuation testimony based upon royalty
capitalization may be accepted only if no other expert comes forward
with probative comparable sales. Typically, one party will seek to rely
upon the discounted royalty method, and the other party will offer sales
which are alleged to be comparable. This scenario creates a situation
in which the determination whether the sales are in fact comparable is
dispositive of the case since the offer of evidence by one side or the
other must fail. In UnitedStates v. 103.38 Acres ofLand, the trial court
concluded that none of the sales cited by the government were
sufficiently comparable to be of probative value." However, this issue
is rarely clear cut, and it is likely that differing opinions by experts with
varying credentials and degrees of credibility will be presented by both
sides as to whether the sales are comparable. Appraisers routinely
make significant adjustments in their comparable sales analysis for
characteristics that differ between the comparable sale and the property
which is the subject of the condemnation proceeding. Thus, whether
the differences in allegedly comparable properties are merely matters
which go to the weight of the evidence or render the sales noncomparable, becomes a very subjective matter with potentially
disastrous consequences to the losing party. The practical application
of such an exclusionary rule becomes particularly difficult when the
landowner, who must offer evidence first, seeks to introduce evidence
of a discounted royalty value. The trial court in such circumstances
would either be required to excuse the jury and take evidence from the
condemnor's proponent of comparable sales and any rebuttal by the
landowner, or the trial court would allow the evidence of both parties
to be provisionally heard by thejury. Upon completion of the evidence,
thejudge would give instructions to thejury to disregard all or a portion
of one party's evidence.
The Sixth Circuit did little in UnitedStates v. L.E. Cooke Co. 4
to clarify circumstances under which separate valuations of mineral
resources may be received. One of the government witnesses relied
upon his experience to compute a discounted rate per ton of mineable
coal in place but admitted that he had neither performed a "true"

2

1d. at 212.
11/d. at 211.
'United States v. L.E. Cooke Co., 991 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1993).
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discounted royalty analysis nor had he "exactly" used a comparable
sales analysis." The landowner contended that such expert's testimony
had been wrongly admitted because it was not based upon industry
standards and was contrary to the prong of Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence which requires that expert opinion be in conformity
with generally accepted explanatory theory. 6 The landowner argued
that the government's expert failed to follow the discounted cash-flow

method described by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. 103.38 Acres
ofLand 7 The Sixth Circuit responded that its decision in that case did
not hold that the discounted cash-flow analysis was the "only"
acceptable method of valuation "in the absence of comparable sales." ' s
The court further stated that the owner's compensation depends upon
the circumstances of each case, that no general formula should be used,
and that some speculation is inherent in any valuation.59 It also noted
that the Federal Rules of Evidence allow an expert great liberty in

determining the basis of his opinions and that whether an expert should
be accepted as having an adequate basis is a matter for the trier of fact
to decide.60

In issuing such pronouncements favoring a liberal standard of
admissibility, the Sixth Circuit restated its preference for the
comparable sales method of valuation and quoted its decision in United

States v. 2,847.58 Acres of Land, for the proposition that a broad rule
'
of admissibility is favored "when comparable sales do not exist."', The
court, however, specifically noted that the other experts for both the

55

L.E. Cooke, 991 F.2d at 340.
'Id. at 341. The Sixth Circuit noted that it had adopted in Sterling v. elsicol
Chemical Corp. a four-part test to determine whether expert opinion should be admitted pursuant
to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: "(I) a qualified expert (2) testify'ing on a proper
subject (3) which is in conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory (4) the probative
value of which outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id at 341 (quoting Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical
Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1208 (6th Cir. 1988)). The third requirement regarding general acceptance
has been placed subsequently in doubt by Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509
U.S. 579, (1993) and the subsequent opinions of the courts of appeals which have wrestled with
the extent to which the analysis of Daubertshould be extended to expert testimony based upon
"technical or other specialized knowledge." See American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. General Electric
Co., 45 F.3d 135, 137-138 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147 (6th Cir. 1997).
1
L. E. Cooke, 991 F.2d at 342.
5
RId. at 342.
59
1d,
60id.
"6Id.at 342. The United States Supreme Court cited United States v. L.E. Cooke Co.
in Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) for the proposition that
determinations of market value are routinely made in proceedings without the benefit of a market
transaction in the subject property, but did not address whether the existence of comparable sales
would require application of the unit rule.
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landowner and the government had identified comparable sales.62
Therefore, it is unclear from the L.E. Cooke decision under what, if
any, circumstances the existence of comparable sales should preclude
opinion testimony based upon discounted royalty calculations or other
methods of valuation which place a separate value on the mineral
deposit."3 Thus, it remains to be seen whether the Sixth Circuit's
substantial reliance upon the analytical framework of Rule 702 signals
ajettisoning by the Sixth Circuit of the link between the application of
the unit rule and the availability of comparable sales which
characterized its prior decisions.
D. The Fourth Circuit's Interpretation of the Unit Rule
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, like the Sixth Circuit, has
expressed a preference for comparable sales as the best evidence of
market value, but it has not tied its analysis of the unit rule to the
presence or absence of comparable sales.
In UnitedStates v. Wise," the appellant argued that it was error
to admit evidence of the reproduction cost of structural improvements
on the property, evidence of the reproduction or replacement cost of
trees and shrubs, and evidence relating to the original cost of extending
a road and utilities to the property. 5 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
admission of such evidence since the trial court had instructed the jury
that it was not to add the worth of the separate components. However,
it could consider a breakdown of the individual characteristics of the
property in arriving at the value of the property as a whole, since a
shrewd and able purchaser would probably consider these factors when

6
"L.E. Cooke, 991 F.2d at 342. The landowner's expert testified that there were onlytwo
sales which were similar enough to be considered comparable and that these sales were insufficient
to establish a market. The district court allowed the landowner's expert to give an opinion of value
based upon a discounted cash flow analysis. However, the government's other expert denied that
any of the coal was mineable and gave an opinion of value based upon a comparable sales analysis
of four transactions.
6
Perhaps the best explanation ofthe L.E. Cooke decision is that it involved a marginal
coal resource where the experts differed in their opinion as to the property's highest and best use.
The landowner's expert considered the property's highest and best use to be coal mining, while one
government expert considered it to be a "highly speculative future coal resource," and the
government's other expert considered the property not to be economically mineable. Id. at 342.
The Sixth Circuit appears to have determined that under such circumstances it was not going to
disturb ajury verdict where both sides had had an opportunity to fully present their own evidence
and cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
"United States v. Wise, 131 F.2d 851 (4th Cir. 1942).
"Id. at 851.
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determining the price he would pay for the property.66 The Fourth
Circuit noted that the admissibility of evidence of this character is
largely governed by the peculiar circumstances of each case and rests
to a great extent on the discretion of the trial judge.67
The Fourth Circuit expressed in United States v. 25.406Acres
of Land 8 a strong commitment to allowing experts wide latitude in
explaining the basis of their opinions where such methods correspond
to the business practices of the marketplace. 69 The court affirmed the
admission of testimony as to the estimated income which could be
generated from a planned development. This evidence could not be
used as direct evidence of value, but could be considered by the witness
in arriving at an estimate of value.70 As an example, the Fourth Circuit
stated that, "If oil had been discovered beneath the property, it would
certainly have been proper for its availability for oil production to have
been considered as bearing on its market value, and in this connection
for a witness to have considered what it would cost to drill for the oil
and what production could reasonably have been expected.""'
In UnitedStates v. 5139.5 Acres ofLand,72 the Fourth Circuit
reversed the decision of the trial court to exclude evidence of the
separate value of timber.73 The court noted that while the trial courts
concern that the land and timber should be valued as a whole was a
sound rule of law, such concern was not a proper reason to exclude
evidence of the separate value of the timber. The separate value of the
timber was to be considered in valuing the land and timber together.74
The Fourth Circuit stated that this was especially true where the experts
valued the timber separately in conjunction with their valuation of the
whole.75

61d. at 852.
6'Id. The Fourth Circuit distinguished the Sixth Circuit's rejection ofsimilar evidence
in Devou v. City of Cincinnati,not on the grounds of the availability of comparable sales, but
rather, because the Fourth Circuit viewed the evidence of cost ofthe building offered in Devou to
be misleading because of the deterioration of the building's neighborhood since its construction.
"United States v. 25.406 Acres of Land, 172 F.2d 990 (4th Cir. 1949).
19d. at 995.
701d.
at 993.
71d.
"United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1952).
"Id. at 659.
41d. at 661.
71d. at 661. See United States v. Wateree Power Co., 220 F.2d 226, 232 (4th Cir.
1955) (approved the receipt of separate valuations of the land for unrelated purposes); See also
United States v. Cunningham, 246 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1957) (approved the receipt of evidence of
values of portions of the property for special purposes, but required that the property be valued as
a whole).
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The Fourth Circuit's rejection of the unit rule was extended to
76
the separate valuation of mineral deposits in Cade v. United States.
The court held that, "The value of a rock deposit, like the value of a
coal mine or an oil well or a building may properly be shown as bearing
upon the value of the property being taken, even though the measure of
recovery is the overall value of the property."" The court concluded
that valuation of the land as a whole after giving a valuation of the
various parts was justified because such method was the manner in
which any man of intelligence would value property for "ordinary
business purposes."78 The Fourth Circuit stated that such separate

evidence was necessary to apply the rule that the land's most profitable
use in the reasonably near future may be shown and considered as
bearing upon the market value." 9 The Fourth Circuit endorsed the
receipt of evidence of price-times-unit values by quoting with approval
that portion of the decision in NationalBrick Co. v. UnitedStates"0 that
stated, "we know of no other evidence by which the jury could be
properly guided in determining the value of the property than to be told
the per ton value of the sand as it lay, or, without this knowledge, how
the jury could ever have reached a judgment based on anything more
than guess or speculation.'
A computation of value based upon hypothetical future income
from the operation of a "borrow pit" was rejected by the Fourth Circuit
in United States v. Whitehurst 2 because a proper foundation for
demand had not been established.83 This court stated that comparable
sales are the best evidence of value, but it further noted that the
capitalization of income method to determine the value of a borrow pit
should not be rejected in all cases." The court stated that if all of the
necessary factors are established by proper evidence, "there would
appear to be no valid reason to judicially condemn, prohibit or outlaw
the use of this method. 85

"Cade v. United States, 213 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1954).
I1d at 142.

Id. at 140. See United States v. 97.19 Acres of Land, 582 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1978).
"Cade, 213 F.2d at 140. The court was satisfied that an adequate foundation for
opinion testimony regarding the valuation ofa granite deposit was established by proofofa general
market for such granite, and did not require proofofspecific plans for the development of a quarry.
Id.
'National Brick Co. v. United States, 131 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Cade,213 F.2d at 142 (quoting National Brick Co., 131 F.2d at 31).
"United States v. Whitehurst, 337 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1964).
831d.
at 765.
"Id.
"Id. at 776.
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Thus, the Fourth Circuit was careful in Whitehurst to preserve
the opportunity to separately value mineral deposits in a manner
consistent with industry practice. On the other hand, when it was
argued that the discounted royalty rate method of valuation was used
almost exclusively by the coal mining industry and that all other
methods of valuation should be excluded, the Fourth Circuit refused, in
United States v. Upper Potomac Properties Corp., 6 to abandon
traditional appraisal concepts. The court held that despite such industry
practice, it was proper to instruct that comparable sales are the best
evidence of value. 7
The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Upper Potomac
PropertyCorp., noted, without apparent criticism, that the trial court
had instructed that white comparable sales are the best evidence of
value, they are not the only evidence of value, and that the jury "could
also consider the price per ton of coal and the royalty rate in arriving at
the amount to be paid to defendants." 8 On the other hand, the Fourth
Circuit invited consideration of United States v. Sowards89 for a
discussion of whether the discounted royalty rate method is an
acceptable method of valuation or a "deviation" from the proper
standard of value.' The Sowards decision concluded that while the
amount of coal in place is important in arriving at an opinion of market
value, courts have generally held that the tonnage multiplied by unit
price is a deviation from the proper standard of valuation. The court
considered this method to be a deviation because the result is based
upon speculation as to the continuing existence of a theoretical future
market. 9'
In United States v. 69.1 Acres of Land,92 the Fourth Circuit
clarified that its discomfort with the capitalized royalty method does not
arise from the separate valuation of minerals but from a concern that an
adequate foundation for such opinions must be established. 93 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that the so-called "royalty" or "income

'United States v. Upper Potomac Properties Corp., 448 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1971).
"'The Upper Potomac PropertyCorp. decision, like L.E. Cooke Company, involved
a landowner who had had its opportunity to present its own evidence based upon the discounted
royalty method of valuation and who complained that the condemning authority had not applied
a similar methodology.
"Upper Potomac Properties Corp., 448 F.2d at 917.
"United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1966).
9"Upper Potomac PropertiesCorp., 448 F.2d at 917.
"Soward, 370 F.2d. at 90.
92United States v. 69.1 Acres of Land, 942 F.2d 290 (4th Cit. 1991).
"Id. at 293.
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capitalization" method (that takes a specific number of units of the
mineral, multiplies it by projected prices into the future, then discounts
the flow of income to a present value) is disfavored by federal courts. 4
The Fourth Circuit, however, did not prohibit such testimony, but it
cautioned that before a court should allow value to be proved "in such
a suspect manner, impeccably objective and convincing evidence" of
future demand, including "volume and duration," is required.95
Thus, it is apparent that the Fourth Circuit recognizes a
distinction between the application of the unit rule to exclude all direct
valuation of the mineral resource, and the application of the unit rule to
exclude royalty or income capitalizations, on a case by case basis,
where there is inadequate proof of future demand for the mineral."
II. CONCLUSION
The unit rule was developed to prevent a property from being
overvalued by valuing the property with regard to its adaptability to
inconsistent uses. Therefore, the unit rule precludes the separate
valuation of the individual characteristics of the property, such as
minerals or timber. The rule has been applied generally by requiring
the exclusion of evidence and expert opinions concerning the separate
value of the resource, rather than by instructing the fact-finder that the
property must be valued as a whole.
The major drawback of the application of the unit rule to the
valuation of mineral-bearing property is that it prevents the property
from being valued in the manner that such properties are valued in the
marketplace by willing buyers and willing sellers. Comparable sales of
rural property are generally reduced to a value per acre. This is a twodimensional unit of measurement which may be a meaningful concept
in expressing the value of the property derived from its ability to grow
crops or to support structures, but there is no inherent relationship
between "acreage" and the volume or tonnage of minerals underlying

"Id. at 293. The court stated that, "These valuations almost always achieve chimerical
magnitude, because, in the mythical business world of income capitalization, nothing ever goes
wrong. There is always a demand; prices always go up; no competing material displaces the
market." Id.(citation omitted) However, the court failed to recognize that a properly determined
discount rate would include a substantial "risk component" to reflect the risk of future market
fluctuations and unknowns. Id.
"Id. at 294.

'The Fourth Circuitnoted the Sixth Circuit's decision in UnitedStatesv. 103.38 Acres
of Land,as approving the use of the income capitalization method, but requiring strict evidence
of a basis for such method in the real market.
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a particular property. Thus, expressions of price per ton or price per
cubic yard provide a more accurate method of calculating the value of
three-dimensional mineral deposits and a more accurate method of
arriving at the value of the "whole" property, of which they are a
significant component.
Hence, it is not surprising that a major coal-producing state,
such as West Virginia, has abandoned the exclusionary aspects of the
unit rule and has opted to address the problems relating to excessive
valuations of properties for incompatible uses by directing that trial
courts give appropriate instructions regarding the valuation of the
property as a whole.97
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
followed a similar course of allowing evidence of the separate value of
minerals and other components of the property to be considered in
determining the value of the property as a whole. However, it has
cautioned that before mining projections may be used to value mineral
deposits there must be adequate proof of future demand.9" The Fourth
Circuit has distinguished between properties that have a highest and
best use as future mineral reserves, which must be valued by
comparison to the established market for such minerals in place, and
properties where mining in the immediate future is the highest and best
use, which may be valued by the discounted royalty method. In either
case, the value of the minerals may be expressed as a value per ton for
purposes of assisting the finder of fact in arriving at the value of the
whole property.
On the other hand, Kentucky adopted the unit rule in a case
involving a non-coal mineral for which there was no established
market." Although individual justices have suggested that the unit rule
should not apply to properties containing coal reserves, Kentucky
remains mired in staredecisis.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
moved away from the universal application of the unit rule. But, rather
than break directly with the unit rule, it has created an exception
allowing departure from the unit rule when probative comparable sales
are lacking. By linking the application of the unit rule to the existence
of comparable sales, the Sixth Circuit has created a litigious

7

1981).

West Virginia Dep't of Highways v. Berwind Land Co., 280 S.E.2d 609 (W.Va.

's69.1 Acres of Land, 942 F.2d at 290.
"Gulf Interstate Gas Co. v. Garvin, 368 S.W.2d 309 (Ky. 1963).
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environment where there is little certainty whether a party's valuation
evidence will be received.
The unit rule is an exclusionary rule that is philosophically at
odds with the modem rules of evidence that favor the liberal admission
of expert opinions. Although modem case law has limited its
application, the unit rule has shaped legal decisions for decades. It
should not be forgotten that even in jurisdictions which have directly
rejected it, subtle vestiges of the unit rule are likely to continue to frame
many of the issues regarding the valuation of mineral-bearing
properties.

